INTRODUCTION
Developing nations often look to their bounty of natural resources or willing labor as a means of attracting international investors.
2 While national and local governments frequently perceive the arrival of a multinational corporate presence as a boon to their economy, the potential for government instability, ineffectiveness or corruption may facilitate environmentally exploitive corporate practices. 3 Furthermore, residents of the subject nation may be left without proper legal recourse. 4 Legislators have made various efforts in both the United States and abroad to propound
Corporate Codes of Conduct to address such concerns, though most such codes remain voluntary. has not yet proven an effective remedy capable of sanctioning multinational corporations for their illegal or unethical behavior. 13 As voluntary codes of business ethics and United Nations guidelines have also proven ineffective, 14 the United States must develop or support a legal regime capable of providing an effective civil or criminal remedy to the victims of illegal or unethical corporate activity.
Under the current shareholder primacy paradigm 15 -which characterizes the corporation as an economic entity whose purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth 16 -companies will never fully internalize the environmental and social costs of their productive processes and labor relationships in a globalized economy, without an ultimate sovereign. 17 
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-7-managerial responsibility to maximize profits, on the one hand, and the goal of environmental stewardship, on the other. 24 Part V will assess, and ultimately dismiss, the ATS as a viable liability mechanism for environmental degradation abroad. It will also discuss the need to reconceptualize the wealth maximization model to account for greater reciprocal rights in our capitalistic system. Touting the ability of the Ecuadorian courts to provide a "fair and alternative forum" for the plaintiffs' claims, 44 Texaco argued that the case properly belonged in Ecuador, where the evidence and witnesses were predominantly located. 45 The Though the plaintiffs in Kiobel allege international human rights violations, the Supreme Court's holding will bear directly upon the ability to seek a remedy in American courts for environmental degradation abroad under the ATS. The speculation regarding corporate civil liability for extraterritorial behavior, however, lingers for the time being.
III.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTING LIABILITY REGIMES IN AN INCREASINGLY GLOBAL ECONOMY
Though controlling for negative externalities 71 is an exceedingly challenging task, 72 corporate generation of harmful environmental externalities (e.g. pollution) is an unsurprising result of the wealth maximization model. 73 Although capitalism relies on marketplace sentries to establish and enforce certain "rules of the game," the globalization of the economy provides nations fewer incentives and erodes their ability to perform regulatory functions. 74 Globalization, in particular, undermines nations' ability to regulate the activities of transnational companies in an objective manner, and restricts the degree to which they may exercise proactive, regulatory power to stave off environmental harms. 75 For one, companies can more easily relocate production or outsource tasks to other countries to exploit more favorable regulatory conditions. 76 While there is less risk of such relocation in the extractive industries-as the resources 71 An "externality" is a "consequence or side effect of one's economic activity, causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer without compensation. Before we can explore proposals to compel corporations to internalize such costs, however, we must first briefly address the current characterization of the corporate entity.
IV. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AN ERA OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
The field of corporate social responsibility, generally, seeks to question and define the social obligations of companies, as citizens, to the societies in which they are embedded. 81 Proponents of the "profit maximizing view" believe the sole social responsibility of business is to "use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud." 82 Others
77 But see Weiler, supra note 3, at 433 (asking whether foreign direct investment, once it has been committed to a particular country, is as highly mobile as some suggest 
A. The Role of the Corporation in the United States
In the United States, corporations are predominantly viewed as private, economic entities whose purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth. 87 The consensus suggests that corporations bear no particular social responsibilities beyond profit maximization for the benefit of shareholders.
88
Under this view, "the constraints of law, buttressed in some specific instances by contractual obligations . . . will be sufficient to ensure that companies fully internalize all of the social and environmental costs of their productive processes and labor relationships." 89 While employees, corporate responsibility as essentially nonexistent "unless it happens to be an accidental and spontaneous outcome of otherwise self-interest financial motives of a profit-maximizing corporation."). 83 Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 61, at 254. 84 Williams, supra note 9, at 707 (characterizing the corporation as both an economic and social entity); see also 
B. The Tension Between Profit Maximization and Environmental Stewardship
While the law provides corporations with many of the same rights as humans, it cannot rely upon corporations to be constrained by internal moral and social checks and balances natural to most humans. 93 Rather, corporations are "singularly self-interested and unable to feel genuine concern for others in any context." 94 The corporation's tendency to pursue profit maximization steadfastly, to the exclusion of all else, poses a particular risk to the natural environment, "a resource which only the most selfless and charitable of human beings tend to be prone to preserving." 95 A corporation would thus seem to owe a de facto duty to its shareholders to behave callously when profitable. With this understanding, Chevron has behaved both predictably and appropriately by disclaiming any additional liability for the toxic production pits and tainted water in Ecuador, and mechanisms"); Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 61, at 255 ("It is often ignored that the profit maximization theory is conditioned on companies operating within legal constraints."). 90 Smith, supra note 87, at 278. 91 Id. 92 The most well-known exposition of the shareholder primacy norm comes from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.: "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. 1972) . A state must often decide which of two conflicting interests to favor-for example, an oil company's interest in externalizing the social and environmental costs of pollution as contrasted to the surrounding community's right to breathe clean air-or it risks that access to goods, services, and life will depend upon a system in which "might makes right," wherein the stronger or shrewder party prevails. Id. at 1090. Thus, the law decides which of the conflicting parties claims a superior "entitlement" to pursue its interests. Id. One manner in which the state or federal government may protect such entitlements is via liability rules, in which a party may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it. Id. at 1092. Though the power to make a value determination resides outside the purview of the actor seeking to destroy the entitlement, so long as that party is willing to fulfill its payment obligation, it may not be prevented from transferring or destroying the entitlement. Id. 103 Williams, supra note 9, at 724. 104 One such measure includes imposing more rigorous information disclosure requirements on corporations pertaining to the environmental consequences of the company's activities. See id. at 709 n.7 ("[C]ompanies could be required to provide charts about the specific percentages of their products or services produced or sold in each different country; the minimum wages in those countries; the measures of economic inequality in those countries; and, to the extent the company generally pays wages that are higher than the required minimum wages for various employment categories . profits. 109 At its roots, then, a wealth maximization model requires something far less exploitative than the corporate behavior to which we are accustomed.
110
Economists and legal scholars, including Friedman, discuss the profit maximization paradigm as operating within the bounds of the law. 111 But something more than the technically codified law should control. 112 Economic actors who fail to internalize the effects of their activities are using their property in a manner that harms another, whether or not domestic law prohibits the infringement. Fundamentally, in order to protect any one individual's ability to maximize his profits, the system presupposes that each individual is entitled to the same right. 113 As such, when one individual exploits a resource to the detriment of others, he has unlawfully disadvantaged the others and unlawfully interfered with their rights. Manipulating legal regimes to facilitate self-inurement by exploitation is thus entirely contrary to the foundations of the profit-maximization model, wherein the guarantee of equality and reciprocity allow economic actors to profit without interference.
Though the capability to profit need not be uniform, externalizing the costs of conducting business in a capitalistic system interferes with the property rights of others. In short, the profitmaximization model was never meant to be an exploitation model. 109 In the absence of such reciprocity, and given individuals' freedom to pursue their own interests, a society risks a " would not be authorized. 116 Perhaps, then, operating "within the bounds of the law" ought to mean something more than simply refraining from that which results in jail or fines.
If we ever hope for developing nations-in particular, those with attractive natural resources-to become mature capitalistic states, it is imperative they control for externalities and punish opportunistic exploitation. 117 The law should not condone cunning manipulation of underdeveloped or developing nations. Ethical conduct means more than mere compliance.
B. The Alien Tort Statute is Not the Answer
Under the ATS, plaintiffs must allege a tort in violation of the law of nations-in other words, in violation of well-established, universally recognized norms of international law. 
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-25-on the claim. 132 As such, potential litigation is highly susceptible to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(6), and will remain so until courts no longer see fit to dismiss a claim of environmental harm for lack of universality.
For the above reasons, among others, 133 the ATS is an insufficient mechanism to compel multinational corporations to internalize the environmental costs of doing business. 134 While it may serve as a constraint on certain corporate malfeasance that falls within the ambit of the "law of nations," the ATS-as it is currently understood-possesses very limited power to substantially impact corporate behavior, and should not be the centerpiece of a comprehensive environmental liability regime.
C. Compulsory Multinational and Transnational Corporate Bonding
This Article suggests that an effective way to influence corporate behavior under a wealth maximization model is to require all multinational and transnational corporations doing business in the United States to post a reclamation bond as a precondition to conducting environmentally invasive activities abroad. The United States would require that companies engaging in particular 132 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the plaintiff failed to show that the international law it cited enjoyed universal acceptance in the international community, and that those sources referred only to "state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernible standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts"); Mank, supra note 11, at 1100 ("Purely environmental ATS claims have sometimes encountered difficulties because of questions about whether there are universally recognized norms against such pollution."). Plaintiffs have sought to circumvent the issue by bringing environmental claims based on degradation in conjunction with claims for "cultural genocide," or other human rights violations, but courts have been reluctant to permit such claims to proceed. Id. Courts ultimately dismiss virtually all purely environmental suits under the ATS.
Id. at 1100-01 (noting that courts have generally rejected environmental ATS claims based on a right to live in a clean and healthy environment). 133 Issues of sovereign immunity and the nuances of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), for example, pose additional and substantial problems to the effective use of the ATS as a liability regime for environmental degradation, but any discussion thereof lies beyond the scope of this paper. See also Branson, supra note 59, at 228 (suggesting that plaintiffs and their counsel are "quickly brought back to earth, back to law school fundamentals" because of the many challenges encountered in trying to successfully bring suit against a multinational corporation business activities contribute to a fund administered by a federal regulatory agency of Congress' creation, with the goal of ensuring adequate funding for environmental cleanup efforts. As payouts to aggrieved parties are made, the cost of the bond would necessarily increase, leading to selfpolicing amongst bonding corporations. As the nuances and complexities of such a bonding scheme abound, this Article purports only to sketch some rudimentary contours around which such a system may be more fully realized.
The bonding system is not without precedent in the United States. In 1977, Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 135 which requires companies seeking a permit to engage in coal mining to pay into a bond system operated by the U.S.
government. 136 SMCRA requires that land affected by surface mining must be restored to a condition equal to or greater than the condition prior to mining, 137 and mandates reclamation bonding to assure restoration. 138 To guarantee compliance, SMCRA requires a permittee to submit a reclamation plan to the appropriate regulatory authority indicating how the mining operator plans to comply with SMCRA's reclamation standards, 139 as well as post a reclamation bond after the permit approval process, but prior to commencing mining operations. 140 Such bonding is particularly crucial for the regulatory authority where a permittee fails to complete the reclamation plan approved in the permit. Like its domestic model, the compulsory bonding regime this Article proposes would require companies to develop a reclamation plan as part of a permitting process. 142 The reclamation plan would identify the lands subject to the corporation's activities, the pre-existing condition of the land and its uses prior to commencement of the permittee's operations, the proposed use of the land post-reclamation, a detailed estimated timetable for the accomplishment of each major step in the reclamation plan, and the steps to be taken to comply with air and water quality regulations propounded by the responsible federal regulatory agency.
143
Once a corporation submits an adequate reclamation plan, it would post a corresponding bond. In the United States, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement recognizes three types of reclamation bonds: corporate surety bonds, 144 collateral bonds, 145 and self bonds, 146 the last of which are available only to permittees who meet certain financial tests. While surety and self 142 The proposed compulsory bonding scheme borrows heavily from the domestic model, itself a reasoned program developed over several decades. As such, in articulating the instant bonding scheme, this Article will cite frequently to analogous state and federal requirements. 143 See 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a) (2010). The requirements for corporate reclamation plans may substantially mirror the existing requirements for surface mining control and reclamation under Title 30, though Congress or an empowered regulatory authority may tinker with such requirements to account for certain jurisdictional complexities. 144 A corporate surety reclamation bond consists in a guarantee that a third party surety will undertake to perform a defaulting permittee's reclamation obligations or satisfy any financial obligation or payment owed to the regulatory authority in the event the permittee fails to perform reclamation as required by the bond agreement. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5(a) (2012). 145 A collateral bond is an indemnity agreement in a sum certain executed by the permittee, supported by a collateral deposit with the regulatory authority. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5(b) (2012). The deposit may consist in cash, negotiable bonds, certificates of deposit, letters of credit, or certified checks for the amount of the bond. See id. (listing first-lien interests in real estate; federal, state, or municipal bonds; and investment-grade securities as sufficient collateral bonds). Collateral posted as bond must be owned solely by the permittee, be free of all liens, and be valued at current market value. Performance Bonds, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT (last visited Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.osmre.gov/topic/bonds/BondsOverview.shtm [hereinafter Performance Bonds] ("The regulatory authority reduces the market value of collateral by a margin sufficient to cover the regulatory authority's cost to liquidate the collateral in the event funds are needed for reclamation."). 146 A self bond is, like a collateral bond, an indemnity agreement in a sum certain typically executed by the permittee or its parent company. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5(c) (2012); see also Performance Bonds, supra note 141 (characterizing self bonds as legally binding promises without separate surety or collateral). Self-bonded permittees in the U.S. coal mining industry must maintain a tangible net worth of at least $10 million, possess fixed assets in the U.S. of at least $20 million, and either meet certain financial ratios or have an "A" or higher bond rating. Id.
bonds may suffice in a domestic setting, an effective extraterritorial bonding system requires the existence of a ready fund from which to draw. As such, corporate surety and self bonds are less preferable than collateral bonds in the context of an international bonding system in which impediments to effective reclamation-such as jurisdictional difficulties-must be minimized.
The federal regulatory agency may adopt either a single or incremental bonding scheme.
Under a single reclamation bonding scheme, the permittee would post an initial bond covering all areas subject to the permit, even though the initial operations may not disturb portions of the bonded area until a future date. 147 Under an incremental bonding scheme, however, the bonded area would be segregated into discrete sections, each bonded separately. 148 The regulatory agency should determine the appropriate scheme on a case-by-case basis.
The federal regulatory authority must calculate the reclamation bond required to complete reclamation activities according to its discretion, though federal law should specify both a minimum and maximum bond amount to provide permittee corporations with greater certainty and stability.
149
Ensuring that the government collects adequate funds to guarantee reclamation, however, remains the primary concern. 150 The federal authority should determine the amount of the bond according 150 See Griffin, supra note 135, at 113 (noting that prior to SMCRA, reclamation bonds in the U.S. coal mining industry were often so low that it cost the mining permittee more to reclaim its environmental damage than to simply leave the site unreclaimed, forgo the return of the bond, and repeat the process whenever it moved on to another site).
environmental performance standards developed by the agency. 151 Furthermore, bond calculations should reflect the "worst case scenario," in which the permittee forfeits the bond at the point of maximum reclamation cost liability. 152 As such, the bond calculation will reflect how much it will cost a third party, as opposed to the corporate entity, to complete reclamation. 153 Identifying the condition that triggers the permitting process-and thus the bonding obligation-is another open question. One possibility is to compel contribution to the remediation bond whenever any corporation conducts environmentally-invasive or extractive operations abroad, so long as that company maintains a U.S. presence. A system with such far-reaching effect, however, seems untenable and likely to implicate substantial constitutional concerns. Another option would require that companies conducting extractive activities domestically disclose their mining operations abroad. The federal regulatory authority would then simply impose additional bonding obligations-pertaining to the corporation's extraterritorial activities-as a condition to conducting its similar business domestically. 155 Finally, a third possibility is to marry the compulsory bonding scheme to the state incorporation process in some manner. 156 Regardless of the permitting mechanism, the United States must devise a bonding system broad enough to impact corporate
behavior, yet sufficiently narrow to skirt allegations of overreaching and illegitimacy.
The proposed bonding system disincentivizes permittees from shirking their reclamation responsibilities. If a company is unable to demonstrate that its operations will not continue to generate post-activity effects (beyond the scope of the bond and the reclamation plan), the federal regulatory authority may deny that corporation a permit. 157 Similarly, if a permittee simply fails to complete its reclamation responsibilities-after it has successfully procured a permit and conducted its operations abroad-and the regulatory authority either revokes the permit or forfeits the reclamation bond associated therewith, the defaulting permittee will not receive future permits from 155 Attaching an obligation to participate in a compulsory bonding regime for extractive activities abroad, when that corporation conducts similar activities domestically, may be the most politically tenable and equitable of the options mentioned. 156 The possibilities addressed here do not exhaust all the possible triggering events and conditions to permitting that Congress may wish to explore. Surely, in contemplating the proper and practicable scope of such a bonding regime, Congress would need to stay mindful of prevailing political and foreign relations considerations beyond the scope of the current discussion. 157 See Griffin, supra note 135, at 120 (noting that, in the context of the West Virginia coal mining reclamation bonding program, denial of a permit which forecasts a future pollution discharge is the simplest way to ensure the public will not have to bear the costs of treating the post-mining pollution).
the United States. 158 In the event the bond is insufficient to finance reclamation, the regulatory authority may collect from the permittee the difference between the cost of reclaiming the permit and the amount of the posted bond. 159 Additionally, as noted above, the regulatory body-not the permittee-determines the cost of reclamation. 160 Finally, the reclamation bond is calculated such that it will pay for all projected costs of reclamation in the event the permittee is unwilling or unable.
161
Once the corporation completes the operation(s) for which it sought a permit, it may initiate the bond release process. 162 Similar to domestic requirements, the company would first need to notify local government bodies (in the forum country) and the surrounding community via available, practicable means, before demonstrating adequate remediation, as determined by the regulatory agency. 163 The regulatory authority would release the bond according to a schedule of its own determination, commensurate with the company's reclamation progress.
164
To further ensure remediation, the bonding scheme must include a statutory authorization for citizen suits to compel compliance. 165 Granting federal jurisdiction to entertain suits by noncitizen aliens of the host country, however, may implicate the same issues raised by the ATS, some of which will remain unresolved until (at least) the conclusion of the Kiobel litigation. Due to the lingering jurisdictional concerns, this Article expresses no opinion regarding the viability or wisdom Once again, the mechanics of the bond release protocol will require a substantial quantum of fact-finding and development by the regulatory authority. 163 See id. Unlike the domestic scheme, mandating inspection and evaluation by a U.S. regulatory authority may prove cost-ineffective and expensive, among other things. As such, the regulatory authority would need to develop a protocol by which companies may demonstrate conformity with its reclamation plan. Such a protocol may, for example, require that companies commission independent environmental evaluations by accredited bodies, or submit water and/or soil samples to the federal authority. of compelling corporate contribution to a compensation fund-in addition to the proposed reclamation fund-to satisfy citizen suits for, among other things, related tort damages.
In addition to enacting legislation to create the bonding system itself, Congress must create an advisory council or board to monitor the fiscal health of the reclamation funds. 166 The council would generate reports for Congress, and make recommendations-based on fact-findingsregarding the adequacy of the mandated reclamation bonds. 167 In addition to legislators, the council must include members of the scientific community familiar with the pertinent industries.
168
Furthermore, it must include a member who represents environmental advocacy organizations, a representative of the industry in which the corporation conducts its business, an economist or actuary, a member familiar with the government and industry of the foreign sovereign, and a member who represents the general public.
169
The result of the bonding system is that the entire industry self-regulates to minimize bond contribution. If catastrophic damage occurs, though, the bond constitutes available funding for remediation. Furthermore, if a party is able to determine fault, contribution is adjusted accordingly.
An effective corporate bonding system with extraterritorial reach must thus accomplish at least two 166 West Virginia created a similar coal mining reclamation fund advisory council. See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(f) (2011) ("The council shall, at a minimum: (1) Study the effectiveness, efficiency and financial stability of the special reclamation fund with an emphasis on development of a financial process that ensures long-term stability of the special reclamation program; (2) Identify and define problems associated with the special reclamation fund, including, but not limited to, the enforcement of federal and state law, regulation and rules pertaining to contemporaneous reclamation; (3) Evaluate bond forfeiture collection, reclamation efforts at bond forfeiture sites and compliance with approved reclamation plans as well as any modifications; (4) Provide a forum for a full and fair discussion of issues relating to the special reclamation fund; (5) Contract with a qualified actuary who shall make a determination as to the special reclamation fund's fiscal soundness. This determination shall be completed on the thirty-first day of December, two thousand four, and every four years thereafter. The review is to include an evaluation of the present and prospective assets and liabilities of the special reclamation fund; and (6) Study and recommend to the Legislature alternative approaches to the current funding scheme of the special reclamation fund, considering revisions which will assure future proper reclamation of all mine sites and continued financial viability of the state's coal industry."). 167 See id. 168 See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(b) (2011) (describing a similar special reclamation fund advisory council created to ensure the "effective, efficient and financially stable operation" of West Virginia's special coal mining reclamation fund). 169 See id.
goals: assure that sufficient funds remain available to carry out the reclamation plan, and adequately incentivize permittees to comply with its reclamation plan. 170 An appropriately calculated bonding system will signal that the United States is serious about corporate accountability for externalization of environmental harm.
VI.

IMPOSING GREATER CORPORATE LIABILITY IS COSTLY, MAY OFFEND NOTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND COULD STIFLE INVESTMENT
Even meritless federal suits against corporations may take years to resolve, and may cause substantial damage to the company's reputation in the interim. 171 The costs associated with litigation and damage control may disincentivize corporations from doing business in the less-developed countries from which such suits often arise, to the detriment of the countries' citizens who stood to benefit from foreign investment. 172 The foreign governments will also suffer economically, 173 and may react poorly when American courts render judgments on a sovereign foreign government's actions within its own borders.
174
Specifically, in the context of the bonding system, non-U.S. corporations may balk at maintaining an American presence for fear of becoming subject to personal jurisdiction in an 170 The author acknowledges that a practicable bonding scheme may permit a relevant federal regulatory authority to develop an alternate bonding scheme so long as it, too, effectuates the two primary goals. See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11(c)(2) (2011); see also 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e) (2012) (allowing the Office of Surface Mining to approve an alternative bonding system so long as it assures the regulatory authority will have available sufficient money to complete the reclamation plan for areas that may be in default at any time, and provides a substantial economic incentive for the permittee to comply with all reclamation provisions American court for extraterritorial acts with respect to the United States. 175 The bonding system may thus produce troubling and nonsensical results much like the ATS. In Kiobel, for example, a group of Nigerians sued a Dutch corporation in an American court for acts that took place exclusively within the territorial borders of Nigeria. 176 There may be reason to suspect the bonding system is susceptible to similarly problematic outcomes, which raise complex sovereignty concerns.
Nations possess no general duty to adjudicate claims between aliens for acts committed extraterritorially, and must consider very real concerns about offending sovereignty and meddling in international relations. 177 Furthermore, the United States could not compel non-U.S. corporations without an
American presence to post a bond. Such companies would, thus, possess a strategic advantage over U.S. corporations operating in less-developed countries. 178 Weak environmental law systems will invariably attract the attention and business of multinational corporations, and a nation or state may opt to implement such a regime precisely to increase foreign investment. 179 The risk, of course, is that multinational corporations may see lax environmental regulations as an advantage, and trigger the oft-feared "race to the bottom" in environmental standards.
A study conducted within the last decade, however, found that of the 500 largest There is an additional risk that corporations-even those over whom the United States may exert personal jurisdiction-may contract directly with a foreign sovereign and choose to simply ignore the American bonding requirements (particularly where the corporation is unable to procure a permit for its activities).
The federal government may address both the sovereignty and intentional avoidance issues by seeking to enact the above-described bonding scheme in concert with international treaties with those nations about whom the United States expresses the most concern in terms of environmental exploitation. In buttressing a liability regime with bilateral treaties, the U.S. may demonstrate its respect for notions of sovereignty, while affording the forum or host nation the benefit of its regulatory regime and infrastructure. In the absence of such a treaty, though, the U.S. government proof exists to justify the perceived downward regulatory spiral or "race to the bottom" on a macroeconomic level remains an open question). Environmentalist are nonetheless concerned that the ability of multinational corporations to do business anywhere in the world may still result in a "race to the bottom." Shaughnessy, supra note 5, at 161. 181 MEDARD GABEL & HENRY BRUNER, GLOBAL, INC. 131 (2003) . 182 Branson, supra note 59, at 228. Another difficulty in holding multinational corporations liable for environmental harm is the fact that their activities often cross international boundaries, and nations do not generally legislate over acts performed outside their territory, by those other than their citizens, due to sovereignty concerns. Perry-Kessaris, supra note 17, at 363. As discussed in this Article, it is still unclear whether U.S. courts are willing to entertain suits against foreign corporations for acts committed exclusively on foreign soil. may need to consider imposing regulatory fines upon, or seizing the assets of, companies who opt to dodge legally-mandated bonding requirements.
The bonding system is also designed to stave off potential litigation by forcing companies to consider the impact of their operations prospectively, which should lead to a net decrease in meritless litigation. If the government created the above-mentioned additional compensation fund, 183 however, opportunistic litigants may seek to exploit the system, knowing there exists a fund to satisfy their claims. 184 The regulatory agency may limit the ability to which civil plaintiffs benefit unduly from the system by providing for permissive government intervention in any civil suit it wishes to pursue. Ultimately, though, litigants must rely on the adjudicatory process, and mechanisms like discovery, to deter plaintiffs seeking to wheedle their way into an American court.
Finally, the prevalence of sophisticated corporate enterprises utilizing decentralized governance structures and subsidiaries to conduct business may add another wrinkle to the permitting and bonding scheme. To prevent companies from exploiting their intricate and strategic organizational structures, the bonding regime must require corporations to acknowledge and assume responsibility for the activities of all subsidiary, cousin or affiliate corporations for the limited purpose of posting a remediation bond.
The risk that corporations will bypass American regulatory requirements, or that businesses will reign in investments in American markets, are surely of great concern. Regulatory agencies must thus remain cognizant that multinational corporations are not malevolent entities comprised of evildoers, and should draft legally coercive measures no broader than required. Ultimately, though, the increased bureaucracy, risk of frivolous litigation, and danger of "regulatory chill" are in service of protecting our only biosphere. Simply put, forcing those who would degrade or permanently damage our only ecosystem to account for their behavior must trump all else.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In 2010, developing economies for the first time absorbed close to half of global foreign direct investment (FDI) 186 inflows. 187 International production is expanding, and foreign sales, employment and assets of transnational corporations are all increasing. 188 Given the increasing importance of corporate investments in developing countries-as private capital replaces official development funds-the social significance of corporate conduct is concomitantly enhanced.
189
While globalization has not yet precipitated an environmental "race to the bottom,"
domestic regulations have not sufficiently addressed the manifold of environmental problems resulting from industrial activities in a time of greater capital mobility. 190 Certain environmental exigencies, most chiefly concerns over climate change, are likely to spur a more urgent push for multilateral and coordinated efforts to combat the results of such activities.
